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CHURCH AND STATE IN THE STATES*
G. Alan Tarr**
Abstract" In many state constitutions, the provisions dealing with the relationship of
church and state differ substantially from the federal establishment clause. In this Article,
Professor Tarr demonstrates that relying on the state constitutional guarantees may lead
to markedly different results than would obtain under the first amendment. He argues
that state constitutional provisions very often are ignored, apparently because practition-
ers mistakenly believe that state provisions merely repeat the strictures of the first amend-
.ment. Professor Tarr maintains that this is unfortunate and untrue, because our
constitutional system allows a state constitution to provide for less, equal, or greater sepa-
ration of church and state than is mandated by the federal Constitution. Moreover, state
constitutions often incorporate a distinctive perspective on church and state relations, due
to many states' historical experiences in dealing with issues of religious freedom. Professor
Tarr traces the historical experiences in Virginia and New York, demonstrating how they
affected those states' constitutional protections of church and state, and shows that many
state guarantees either reflect similar struggles over religion or borrow language from
states that experienced such battles. More specifically, Professor Tar argues that the his-
torical experiences in many states led to clearer language relating to the separation of
church and state than is found in the first amendment, and that fidelity to state constitu-
tional mandates requires that state courts not dismiss the state constitution and decide
issues solely based on the first amendment, but rather give effect to the distinctive state
constitutional perspective. He concludes that turning first to state constitutional guaran-
tees in establishment clause cases is desirable and proper under our federal system.
When the Harvard Law Review surveyed current developments in
state constitutional law in 1982, it completely ignored rulings by state
courts interpreting their states' religion guarantees.1 This was hardly
an isolated omission. The rediscovery of state bills of rights, usually
referred to as the new judicial federalism, has prompted the publica-
tion in law reviews and social science journals of numerous articles
dealing with state constitutional law.2 Only a handful of these articles,
* This Article is a revised and expanded version of a paper presented at the conference on
"State Constitutions in the Third Century of American Federalism," sponsored by the Center for
the Study of Federalism, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, March, 1987. A much briefer version of
this presentation was published in 496 ANNALS 65 (1988). Research on this Article was
undertaken under a fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities, with
additional research support provided by the Rutgers University Research Council. The author
gratefully acknowledges this generous support.
** Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, Rutgers University-
Camden. B.A. 1968, College of the Holy Cross; M.A. 1970, Ph.D. 1976, Political Science,
University of Chicago.
1. Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1324 (1982) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
2. Seminal articles promoting the new judicial federalism include: Brennan, State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Linde,
Without "Due Process"--Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REv. 125 (1970); Project
Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 271 (1973).
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however, has examined state rulings dealing with religious liberty or
with church and state, and even fewer have offered in-depth analyses
of state constitutional provisions dealing with religion.'
This failure to give more than cursory attention to state constitu-
tions and state constitutional rulings is regrettable, because a number
of states have sought to devise their own solutions to the complex
issues of religious liberty and of church and state.' The omission is
doubly unfortunate because it comes at a time when the United States
Supreme Court's jurisprudence under the first amendment's religion
clauses is widely perceived to be in disarray.' Often in recent years the
Supreme Court's rulings under the establishment clause have com-
manded only narrow majorities, with dissenters directly challenging
Recent collections of articles include: New Developments in State Constitutional Law, 17 PUBLIUS
1 (1987), State Constitutions in a Federal System, 496 ANNALS 12 (1988). For bibliographies of
the extensive and growing literature on the new judicial federalism, see DEVELOPMENTS IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 317-35 (B. McGraw ed. 1985)[hereinafter DEVELOPMENTS];
Tarr, Bibliographical Essay, in STATE SUPREME COURTS 206-08 (1982); Collins, State
Constitutional Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29, 1986, at S-8. Until recently, it was not far off the mark
to suggest that there were as many articles extolling the new judicial federalism as there were
decisions exemplifying it. However, this situation seems to be changing. For a listing of "rights
affirming" rulings based on state constitutions since 1950, see Collins & Galie, Models of Post-
Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitutional Individual Rights Decisions, 16
PUBLIUS 111 (1986).
3. Among the articles devoted to state courts' interpretations of state guarantees of religious
liberty, see Tarr, State Constitutionalism and "First Amendment Rights, " in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE STATES (1988); Conklin & Vache, The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of
the Washington Constitution-A Proposal to the Supreme Court, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 411
(1985); Utter & Larsen, Church and State on the Frontier: The History of the Establishment
Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 451 (1988); Note,
California Teachers Association v. Riles: California Sets a New Standard for Public Aid to
Parochial Schools, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 433 (1983); Note, Beyond the Establishment
Clause: Enforcing Separation of Church and State Through State Constitutional Provisions, 71
VA. L. REV. 625 (1985).
4. This Article refers both to "religious liberty" and to "church and state." This reflects the
fact that American constitutions, whether federal or state, have pursued dual objectives in
dealing with religious liberty. Thus both federal and state constitutions protect the right of each
person to choose his or her religious beliefs and to practice that faith. Second, they have sought
to regulate the relationship between church and state, usually by requiring the state to maintain a
degree of separation between itself and religious institutions.
For the distinctive solutions of the states to problems of church and state, see infra notes
117-67 and accompanying text.
5. Illustrative of this perception is the comment of Mark V. Tushnet: "Dean Choper, like
virtually everyone else who has thought about the religion clauses, finds the Supreme Court's
treatment of religion clause issues unsatisfactory." Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in
the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 997, 997 (1986). For further
evidence, see Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72
CALIF. L. REV. 817 (1984); Marshall, "We Know It When We See It'-- The Supreme Court and
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986); Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr.
Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770.
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the Court's basic understanding of the clause. Even justices who are
sympathetic to the Court's interpretation of the establishment clause
have acknowledged difficulties in applying the Court's standards to
specific situations.6 The Court's rulings under the free exercise clause
have produced similar fragmentation among the justices.7
Scholarly commentary on the relationship between church and state
has largely mirrored these intracourt divisions. Some scholars, usually
identified as "separationists," maintain that the establishment clause
of the first amendment is meant to erect a wall of separation between
church and state and closely monitor judicial decisions for breaches in
the wall.8 Other scholars, known as "accomodationists," insist that
the primary aim of the establishment and free exercise clauses is to
promote religious liberty.9 Therefore, they urge that the clauses be
interpreted in such a way that voluntary religious exercise might flour-
ish. Over the decades the debate has raged, with little evidence that
either the accomodationists or the separationists are changing their
positions.
Because this judicial and scholarly stalemate shows no sign of end-
ing, it might be worth considering whether state constitutional guaran-
tees can offer surer and more consistent direction for a jurisprudence
of church and state. In support of this project, this Article examines
how state constitutions and state constitutional law have contributed
and can contribute to resolving issues concerning the proper relation-
ship between church and state, often referred to as "establishment
clause" issues.10
6. Cases illustrating the divisions on the United States Supreme Court in establishment clause
cases include: School Dist. v. Ball, 465 U.S. 1064 (1984), aff'd, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). The challenge to the
Court's interpretation of the establishment clause is presented in Chief Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985). On the difficulties faced even by those
justices who have subscribed to the Court's position on establishment clause issues, see Justice
Marshall's comment in Witters v. Washington Dep't. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 485
(1986): "The Establishment Clause has consistently presented this Court with difficult questions
of interpretation and application."
7. Indicative of the divisions on the United States Supreme Court in free exercise cases are
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Quaring v.
Peterson, 472 U.S. 478 (1985). On the relation between the Court's free exercise and
establishment rulings, Justice Scalia complained in Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2595
(1987): "We have not yet come close to reconciling Lemon [v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)]
and our Free Exercise cases, and typically we do not really try."
8. For a vigorous presentation of the separationist position, see L. PFEFFER, CHURCH STATE
AND FREEDOM (1967), and L. PFEFFER, RELIGION STATE, AND THE BURGER COURT (1985).
9. A major accomodationist analysis is presented in McConnell, Accomodation of Religion,
1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
10. In actuality, although most state consitutions deal with the relationship between church
and state, relatively few have an "establishment clause" closely resembling that found in the first
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In suggesting that jurists explore the possibility of a state constitu-
tional jurisprudence of church and state, this Article is not endorsing
either a separationist or an accommodationist stance. In fact, given
the distinctiveness of state constitutional guarantees and state consti-
tutional history, those who approach state constitutions with precon-
ceived positions derived from federal constitutional law likely will be
disappointed. Many states' constitutional provisions dealing with reli-
gion developed over time, largely in response to specific conflicts.
Characteristically they reflect their origins in these disputes, display-
ing greater specificity and detail than do the analogous provisions of
the federal Constitution. In many instances, the state provisions also
reveal a different perspective on the relationship between church and
state than is found in the federal Bill of Rights.
To explore these distinctive state provisions, this Article is divided
into four parts. Part I briefly places the state constitutional provisions
dealing with church and state in context by showing how they relate to
state guarantees of religious liberty and to the free exercise and estab-
lishment clauses of the first amendment. Part II analyzes the histori-
cal and constitutional experience underlying several states'
constitutional provisions dealing with church and state. Part III
explores the implications of this history for the development of a state
jurisprudence of church and state by critically examining rulings inter-
preting the state provisions. Finally, Part IV considers whether states
should pursue an independent constitutional course on church-state
issues.
I. THE LEGAL CONTEXT
A. Religious Liberty Under State Constitutions
Although this Article focuses on "establishment clause" issues, this
does not mean that state bills of rights offer no independent direction
for resolving issues involving religious liberty or the free exercise of
religion." On the contrary, a survey of state constitutional guarantees
suggests just the opposite. For one thing, many state constitutions
contain protections for religious liberty that are more detailed and spe-
cific than those found in the federal Constitution. Several of the origi-
amendment of the United States Constitution. For an invaluable guide to state constitutional
provisions dealing with religion, see Collins, Bills and Declarations of Rights Digest, in THE
AMERICAN BENCH 2500-01 (3d ed. 1985/86).
11. For fuller treatments of the free exercise of religion under state constitutions, see C.
ANTIEAU, P. CARROLL, & T. BURKE, RELIGION UNDER STATE CONSTUTIONs 65-99 (1965)
[hereinafter C. ANTIEAU]; Tarr, supra note 3.
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nal thirteen states, for example, recognized in their initial constitutions
a "natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according
to the dictates of [one's] own conscience." 12 Similar language has been
adopted by constitutionmakers in sister states.1 3 Nineteen states also
specifically bar religious tests for witnesses or jurors. '4
Additionally, while the first amendment offers no express guidance
on how to reconcile the claims of free exercise of religion with the
legitimate exercise of the state police power,' 5 some twenty state con-
stitutions have attempted to resolve potential conflicts by including a
police power qualification on the free exercise of religion. 6 Several
state bills of rights have also specifically taken account of religious
scruples involving military service by exempting conscientious objec-
tors from service in the state militia.' 7 Finally, at least two state con-
stitutions-those of Louisiana and Montana-prohibit certain types of
discrimination based on religion not only by government but also by
private parties.18
Despite the strong commitment to religious liberty indicated by
these provisions, state courts have generally relied on federal law and
federal doctrine in deciding "free exercise" cases. 9 One effect of rely-
ing on federal precedent has been to retard the development of a state
constitutional law of religious liberty.20 Another effect has been to
12. Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, § 3; see also DEL. CONsT. art. 29; N.J. CONST. of
1776, art. XVIII.
13. See eg., TENN. CONST of 1870, art. I, § 3, reprinted in 6 F. THORPE, FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3253 (1909).
14. See Collins, supra note 10, at 2501 (listing states barring religious tests for witnesses or
jurors).
15. This has resulted in the Supreme Court developing its own standards for reconciling the
demands of free exercise with the states* legitimate police power ends. See, eg., Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
16. Representative is N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 3, which reads: "[Blut the liberty of conscience
hereby secured shall not be construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or so justify practices
inconsistent with the peace or safety of this state." For a full listing of these provisions, see
Collins, supra note 10, at 2496-99.
17. See, eg., COLO. CONST. art. XVII, § 5; IDAHO CoNsT. art. XIV, § 1; ILL. CONST. of
1870, art. XII, § 1.
18. LA. CONST. art. I, § 12; MONT. CONsT. art. II, § 4.
19. The tendency of state courts to rely on the Supreme Court's doctrine, even in resolving
contentious issues on which the United States Supreme Court has not ruled, is illustrated by
Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1977) (deprogramming);
People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (religious use of drugs);
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971) (withholding of
medical treatment).
20. It should be noted that the Oregon Supreme Court has made important efforts to
resuscitate the "free exercise" provisions of the Oregon Constitution. See, eg., Cooper v. Eugene
School Dist., 301 Or. 358, 723 P.2d 298 (1986), appeal dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 1597 (1987); Salem
College & Academy v. Employment Div., 298 Or. 471, 695 P.2d 25 (1985).
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absolve state courts from the necessity of resolving possible tensions
between state constitutional provisions mandating a separation of
church and state or forbidding aid to nonpublic schools and provisions
guaranteeing freedom of worship and the free exercise of religion.
Perhaps, given the greater specificity of state constitutional guaran-
tees, such tensions are less likely to arise. Certainly they have not yet
arisen, and therefore this Article shall concentrate on "establishment"
issues and on state constitutional provisions affecting the relationship
between church and state.
B. State Guarantees and Federal Constitutional Mandates
Throughout the nation's history, state constitutions have regulated
the states' involvement with religion. With the incorporation of the
free exercise clause in 194021 and of the establishment clause in 1947,22
state governments became subject to an additional set of constitutional
mandates. When the state and federal constitutions impose identical
requirements, this dual obligation poses no problem. When state and
federal constitutions impose different requirements, however, ques-
tions necessarily arise about the relationship between these
requirements.
Basically, three principles govern the relationship between state and
federal constitutional law.23 First is the supremacy of federal law
within its sphere: under the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution, all conflicts between federal and state law must be
resolved in favor of the federal law.24 Second is the authority of each
system of courts-be it federal or state-to expound its own body of
law. This means that state courts must not only give precedence to
federal over state law, but they must also interpret federal law in
accordance with the rulings of the United States Supreme Court.25
Perhaps less obviously, this principle also means that states need not
21. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
22. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
23. This paragraph draws upon the analysis in Tarr & Porter, State Constitutionalism and
State Constitutional Law, 17 PUBLIUS 1, 8 (1987).
24. The Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 states: "This Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
25. As Justice Inzer of the Mississippi Supreme Court explained in Smith v. State, 242 So. 2d
692, 696 (Miss. 1970): "In determining this question we are constrained to follow the decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States wherein that Court has construed similar statutes
involving the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." For further
recognition of this requirement by state jurists deciding "establishment" cases, see Bowerman v.
Vol. 64:73, 1989
Church and State in the States
be guided by the rulings of the Supreme Court in interpreting their
own constitutions. Third is the so-called autonomy principle: when a
case raises issues of both federal and state law, the United States
Supreme Court will not review a ruling grounded in state law unless
that ruling is inconsistent with federal law. Thus, when a state ruling
rests on an "independent and adequate state ground," it is immune
from review by the Supreme Court.26
How do these principles apply to the relation between the states'
"establishment" provisions and the federal religion clauses, and what
are their implications for the development of a state jurisprudence of
church and state? First, because state judges can interpret their con-
stitutions independently-without reference to federal precedent or
constitutional norms-they may conclude that state constitutions
require less, more, or the same level of separation of church and state
as is required under the federal establishment clause.27 Thus it is sim-
ply wrong to claim, as is so often done, that state constitutions can
only provide greater protection than is available under the federal
Constitution, for the meaning of state provisions does not depend
upon the meaning of their federal counterparts. 2
Second, should a state permit greater support for religion than is
permissible under the federal establishment clause, this does not mean
O'Connor, 104 R.I. 519, 247 A.2d 82, 83 (1968); State ex rel Warren v. Nusbaum, 55 Wis. 2d
316, 198 N.W.2d 650, 653 (1972).
26. Although the doctrine of "independent and adequate state grounds" is of long standing,
the application of this principle has varied over time. For a most important recent ruling, see
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). For discussion of the doctrine, see Kramer, State Court
Constitutional Decisionmaking Supreme Court Review of Nonexplicit State Court Judgments,
1983 ANN. SuRV. AM. LAW 277; Welsh, Reconsidering the ConstitutionalRelationship Between
State and Federal Courts a Critique of Michigan v. Long, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1118
(1984); Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1332-47.
27. For discussion of a less restrictive state provision on church and state, see Resnick v. East
Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 389 A.2d 944, 952 (1978).
28. As noted by a leading commentator on the new judicial federalism:
In a sense, the oft-quoted maxim [that states may extend greater protection than is
available under the Federal Bill of Rights] is wrong, if only because it is unduly simple. It is
erroneous because states may certainly extend an equal measure of constitutional protection
under their state charters, though they may do so for different reasons. More importantly,
there is no constitutional impediment preventing state courts from granting a lesser degree
of protection under state law, provided only that these courts then proceed to apply the
command of the Federal Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. In
other words, the logic of principled interpretation at the state level, being other than
reactionary oriented, demands that any given argument be tested on its own merits
independently of what level of constitutional protection could result.
Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions--Away from a Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1, 15 (1981). For a more recent discussion of this fallacy- which the authors term
"the equivalence plus model" of judicial federalism-and its role in state judicial rulings, see
Collins & Galie, supra note 2, at 117-20.
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that litigants challenging state support for religion would be denied
relief. It merely would mean that they could not obtain relief under
the state constitution. Although their claims might be denied under
the state constitution, state judges still must grant the litigants' claims
under the federal establishment clause, because the judges "may not
interfere with or abridge any federally protected rights or interests."29
Put differently, the federal Constitution continues to provide a
national "floor" for rights, whatever the interpretation of the state
constitution.3
Third, it follows that the federal establishment clause in effect pro-
vides a floor but not a ceiling. State law may require a less stringent
separation of church and state than is mandated by federal law, but in
such circumstances federal law would determine the outcome of a
case. However, state law may-without violating the federal Consti-
tution-mandate a stricter separation of church and state than is
required under federal law, and in such circumstances state law would
be decisive. Admittedly, at some point a state might require such a
stringent separation of church and state that it would impinge on the
free exercise of religion guaranteed by the first amendment. Should
this occur, the state constitutional mandate would yield to the superior
federal requirement. In the absence of a conflict with federal constitu-
tional requirements, however, state law is determinative.
II. LESSONS FROM HISTORY
A. The Struggle for Religious Liberty in Virginia
1. The Development of the Controversy
Virtually every student of American constitutional law is familiar
with the struggle, led by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, for the
establishment of religious freedom in Virginia.3" The story is among
the most hallowed in American constitutional history, containing as it
does uncompromising heroes fighting for a valiant cause, eloquent
rhetoric in support of liberty, an opposition sufficiently strong that the
29. Collins & Galie, supra note 2, at 116.
30. This does not mean, of course, that state constitutional protections should be viewed as
merely supplementary to the "real" federal protections, although some commentators have
drawn this conclusion. See Developments in the Law, supra note 1.
31. This Article relies largely on the following accounts of the Virginia struggle for religious
freedom: T. BUCKLEY, S.J., CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA 1776-1787
(1977); T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS (1986); L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
(1986); W. MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY, pt. 2 (1986); L. PFEFFER, CHURCH STATE AND
FREEDOM 104-05 (1967); A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES, ch. 3
(1950).
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outcome remained in doubt until the last moment, and finally a glori-
ous victory for the forces of progress and tolerance. Yet even this
familiar story can offer new insights if viewed from the perspective of
state constitutionalism.
Although almost all of the colonies had established churches prior
to 1776, the establishment in Virginia was "probably more severe and
oppressive than any other in the country."32 The state strictly
enforced its requirement of compulsory attendance at Anglican serv-
ices, and it taxed members and nonmembers alike for the support of
the established church.3 Members of dissenting sects were subject to
various disabilities, and Baptist preachers in particular were routinely
arrested and imprisoned for "breach of the peace." 3 Not surprisingly,
the establishment of a state church was unpopular with large segments
of the population. In the aftermath of independence, the more oppres-
sive features of the establishment were eliminated, and free exercise of
religion was guaranteed by Virginia's Declaration of Rights.35 None-
theless, as Thomas Jefferson noted, the legislature reserved "the ques-
tion whether a general assessment should not be established by law on
every one to the support of the pastor of his choice; or whether all
should be left to voluntary contributions. '36
Postponing consideration of the question of state-mandated support
for religion did little to reduce the intense feelings the issue provoked.
Battle was joined in earnest in 1784 when Patrick Henry introduced a
"Bill for Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Reli-
gion."'37  On the one side were arrayed the Episcopal (Anglican)
Church and its supporters, who were convinced that an assessment
was necessary for the church's effective operation. They were joined
by others who, although not necessarily adherents of the established
32. L. PFEFFER, supra note 31, at 104-05.
33. T. CuRRY, supra note 31, at 105-06; L. LEVY, supra note 31, at 3-4.
34. T. CURRY, supra note 31, at 134-35. This mistreatment of Baptist ministers particularly
incensed James Madison and strengthened his commitment to religious liberty. See W. MILLER,
supra note 31, at 5-6, 94-96.
35. Virginia Declaration of Rights, § 16 (1776). The language guaranteeing the "free exercise
of religion" was proposed by James Madison as a substitute for the guarantee of "toleration"
proposed by George Mason, the author of the Declaration of Rights. See W. MILLER, supra note
31, at 5; A. STOKES, supra note 31, at 390-97.
36. 1 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 54 (1894), quoted in L. PFEFFER, supra note 31, at
108.
37. Under Henry's proposal, Virginia would collect a property tax, with the taxpayer
determining the denomination to which his money would be given. For a discussion, see L.
LEVY, supra note 31, at 54-55; W. MILLER, supra note 31, at 24-29.
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church, believed that religion could not fulfill its vital civil function of
inculcating morality in the absence of public funding.38
James Madison orchestrated the opposition to the bill. Numerically,
however, the main opposition came from the Baptists, Presbyterians,
and other dissenting sects, who insisted on a strict separation of
church and state not out of hostility or indifference toward religion,
but out of a concern that civil authority not come between the individ-
ual and the working of God's grace. 39 After considerable political
maneuvering and marshalling of popular support, the opponents of the
bill prevailed. Seizing the moment, Madison then introduced Thomas
Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom," which decreed
that:
No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship,
place or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained,
molested, or burdened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer
on account of his religious opinions or beliefs, but that all men shall be
free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinions in matters
of religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect
their civil capacities.4°
In January, 1786, the Virginia legislature eliminated the state's reli-
gious establishment once and for all by enacting the bill.
2. Implications for Interpreting the First Amendment
Scholars and jurists typically have examined the church-state con-
flict in Virginia because of its possible implications for the interpreta-
tion of the first amendment's religion guarantees.41 Yet their
investigations have produced more controversy than agreement, and
the recent escalation of this debate suggests that consensus is a long
way off.
38. The connection between virtue and republican government is stressed in W. MILLER,
supra note 31, at 27-29.
39. The Baptists, of course, had considerable experience with the adverse effects of a religious
establishment in Virginia, but their opposition was principled rather than tied to the history of
persecution in the state. For example, the primary opponent of a religious establishment in
Massachusetts was a Baptist, Isaac Backus. For a discussion of Backus and his efforts, see W.
MILLER, supra note 31, at 211-16.
40. "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom," quoted in THE PORTABLE JEFFERSON 253
(1975).
41. Indeed, early rulings of the United States Supreme Court sought direction in interpreting
the religion clauses of the first amendment from the struggle for religious liberty in Virginia. See
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1947); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878).
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Those endorsing a separationist interpretation of the establishment
clause42 claim that because James Madison introduced in the first
Congress what later became the first amendment of the federal Bill of
Rights and played a crucial role in securing its adoption, his views are
particularly relevant for determining the meaning of the provision.43
Furthermore, the separationists argue that Madison never wavered in
his views on church and state, citing his efforts to secure a strict sepa-
ration of church and state in Virginia and scrupulous avoidance, while
president, of even ceremonial acts which might be construed as a gov-
ernmental endorsement of religion.' Therefore, they conclude, one
can legitimately rely on the views Madison expressed during the Vir-
ginia conflict for determining the meaning of the first amendment. In
1947, in Everson v. Board of Education,45 the United States Supreme
Court endorsed the centrality of the Virginia disestablishment struggle
for understanding the establishment clause and specifically embraced
the separationist interpretation of that struggle and its outcome. In
subsequent rulings the Court has reiterated its separationist reading of
the establishment clause.46
42. Major scholarly works supporting a separationist interpretation of the establishment
clause include L. LEvY, supra note 31; L. PFEFFER, supra note 31.
43. Four states-Virginia, North Carolina, New York, and New Hampshire-proposed
amendments to the Constitution dealing with church and state. James Madison introduced a
reworked version of these proposals and also introduced an amendment of his own that would
have banned state infringements on the rights of conscience. Excerpts from the texts of some of
the state proposals, as well as the amendments proposed by Madison, are reproduced in M.
MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS-THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 3-4 (1978).
44. During his presidency Madison did proclaim several days for fasting and thanksgiving,
which might seem to conflict with a strict separation of church and state. R. CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION, chs. 2-3
(1982). In a letter written some years after his presidency, Madison acknowledged that this
constituted a deviation from "strict principle" brought on by the fact that a war was in progress
on the nation's soil. Madison also noted, however, that during his term of office he "was always
careful to make the Proclamation absolutely indiscriminate, and merely recommendatory; or,
rather mere designations of a day on which all who thought proper might unite in consecrating it
to religious purposes, according to their own faith and forms." L. LEvY, supra note 31, at 100
(quoting 9 WRITINGS OF MADISON, 100-03 (1907)). For an elaboration of Madison's later views
on church and state, see Madison's Detached Memoranda, 3 WM. & MARY Q. 3d Ser. 535,
554-62 (1946).
45. 330 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1947).
46. As Justice Black explained in his opinion for the Court in Everson: "[T]he provisions of
the First Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played such
leading roles, had the same objective and were intended to provide the same protection against
governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia statute." 330 U.S. at 13.
This connection between the Virginia struggle for religious liberty and meaning of the first
amendment was reiterated by the dissenters in Everson. Justice Rutledge, writing for the four
dissenters in the case, noted that "[t]he [First] Amendment . . . is the compact and exact
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Most commentators who espouse an accommodationist reading of
the first amendment acknowledge the depth of Madison's convictions
on the separation of church and state.47 They tend, however, to down-
play the importance to understanding the establishment clause of
Madison's personal convictions, as expressed in the Virginia struggle
for disestablishment. Three justifications are offered for downplaying
Madison's personal views in interpreting the first amendment. First,
the relationship between church and state which Madison championed
in Virginia might have differed from what he sought at the national
level. Second, some commentators argue that in introducing the first
amendment, Madison was not seeking to vindicate his own views but
merely to present the views of those who believed that a bill of rights
was necessary. 48 Finally, some accomodationists suggest that even if
Madison sought to replicate nationally the strict separation found in
Virginia, his views were idiosyncratic and did not represent the think-
ing of the first Congress.49
3. The Development of State Guarantees
Because debate has centered on how the campaign for religious lib-
erty in Virginia affects the interpretation of the establishment clause,
the implications of this debate for the interpretation of state constitu-
tions have not been considered adequately. Most obviously, the dises-
tablishment struggle in Virginia illustrates that a state might, in
summation of its author's views formed during his long struggle for religious freedom." 330 U.S.
at 31. Therefore, he concluded:
No provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given content by its generating
history than the religious clause of the First Amendment. It is at once the refined product
and the terse summation of that history. The history includes not only Madison's
authorship and the proceedings before the First Congress but also the long and intensive
struggle for religious freedom in America, more especially in Virginia, of which the
Amendment was the direct culmination.
330 U.S. at 33-34.
For later reliance by the U.S. Supreme Court on the historical picture painted in Everson, see,
e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213-14 (1963); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333
U.S. 203, 210-12 (1948).
In a major dissenting opinion, Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist recently challenged the
Court's assumption of a close connection between the struggle for religious liberty in Virginia
and the meaning of the first amendment. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92-108 (1985) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
47. Among the major accommodationist scholars, Robert L. Cord is alone in arguing that
Madison was not in fact a consistent separationist. See R. CORD, supra note 44, at 20-36. For
convincing refutations of Cord's position, see L. LEvY, supra note 31, ch. 5; W. MILLER, supra
note 31, pt. 2.
48. See, e.g., M. MALBIN, supra note 43, at 16-17.
49. See, e.g., W. BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 4-11 (1976).
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response to the political and religious forces within its borders, devise
its own solution to the problem of church and state. Whatever their
other differences, neither the accommodationists nor the separationists
challenge the propriety of states embarking on an independent course.
Thus instead of reproducing the relationship between church and state
found at the federal level, the states remain free to impose a stricter or
less strict separation of church and state than is required by the first
amendment.50
This is important, because what occurred in Virginia in 1786 was
far from unique. On the contrary, it exemplifies what has been the
practice among the American states throughout history, namely, the
independent creation of solutions to the problem of church and state."
Between the Declaration of Independence and the ratification of the
Constitution-that is, prior to any action by the national govern-
ment-each of the original thirteen states reconsidered the relation-
ship between church and state within its borders.5 2 Most formalized
new arrangements between these institutions in constitutional provi-
sions. Some states, such as New Jersey, had no formal establishment
during the colonial period and wrote prohibitions against instituting
one into their constitutions. 3 Others, such as South Carolina, which
had maintained exclusive establishments54 throughout the colonial
period, moved toward multiple establishments 55 under pressure from
the Baptists and from other dissenting sects.56 Still others, such as
Massachusetts, which had required all citizens to support the estab-
lished church, liberalized their establishments by permitting citizens to
support the churches of their choice.5 7
50. As noted, the ratification of the fourteenth amendment and subsequent incorporation of
the establishment clause mean that if a state's guarantees are less strict than the comparable
federal provisions, litigants may still prevail on federal grounds. See supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
51. For general treatments of developments in the states from 1776-1787, see T. CURRY,
supra note 31, chs. 6-7; L. LEVY, supra note 31, chs. 1-2.
52. No state other than the original thirteen had a religious establishment prior to statehood,
and thus none had a reason to abolish an establishment.
53. N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX, reprinted in 5 F. THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONs 2597 (1909).
54. An "exclusive establishment" refers to an establishment of religion benefitting a single
church or sect.
55. A "multiple establishment" refers to an establishment of religion benefitting a multiplicity
of churches and/or sects. In America, this usually meant an establishment benefitting all
Protestant sects.
56. On South Carolina's establishment prior to Independence, see T. CURRY, supra note 31,
at 57-60.
57. On the evolution of religious establishments in Massachusetts after Independence, see L.
LEVY, supra note 31, at 26-38.
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As these examples indicate, there was considerable variation in the
arrangements adopted in the various states. Nonetheless, the overall
direction of the movement, as in Virginia, was away from exclusive
establishments and toward disestablishment.58 The pace of this
change varied from state to state. Although all states had begun the
process of disestablishment by 1787, a few-for instance, Connecti-
cut-retained establishments even into the nineteenth century. 9
Eventually, however, religious establishments in all thirteen original
states were eliminated, and state constitutions were revised to reflect
their abolition.' The language employed in banning religious estab-
lishments typically focused on infringements on freedom of worship
and on taxation for the support of an established church, the two most
objectionable features of the colonial experience. Pennsylvania's guar-
antee in large measure is representative:
That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own consciences and understand-
ing; And that no man ought or of right can be compelled to attend,
erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, con-
trary to, or against his own free will and consent. 6'
Yet as important as they are, such guarantees are not the whole
story, and to focus exclusively on the elimination of religious establish-
ments is to distort state constitutional development during the late
eighteenth century. For one thing, the states' constitutional exper-
iences were not homogeneous. 62 As noted, this is even true of the pro-
cess of disestablishment, in which all states eventually moved to a
common position. The substantial interstate differences which can be
found in the pace and course of disestablishment reveal how intrastate
political factors and relationships existing in the states prior to Inde-
pendence shaped the states' constitutional development. 63 The influ-
ence of such intrastate factors on the states' resolution of church-state
issues has continued to the present day.
58. This is thoroughly documented in T. CURRY, supra note 31, chs. 6-7.
59. L. LEVY, supra note 31, at 40-44; A. STOKES, supra note 31, at 73-76.
60. A. STOKES, supra note 31, chs. 3 & 6.
61. PENN. CONST. of 1776, art. II, reprinted in 5 F. THORPE, supra note 53, at 3082.
62. T. CURRY, supra note 31, chs. 6-7.
63. The dynamic character of church-state relationships during the period, as well as the
interstate differences in the course of disestablishment, appear to offer some indirect support for
Mark DeWolfe Howe's contention that the establishment clause served the ends of federalism by
allowing the states to work out their own distinct relationships between church and state without
the interference of the national government. See M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE
WILDERNESS 26 (1965).
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More importantly, if one looks only at the process of disestablish-
ment, one might conclude that the original state constitutions embod-
ied a secularist perspective or, if not, that subsequent constitutional
reyisions initiated a movement in that direction. A more comprehen-
sive survey of state constitutional provisions dealing with religion,
however, reveals that such conclusions are inaccurate."4 In marked
contrast with their federal counterpart, several early state constitu-
tions expressly recognized the existence of God, and later constitutions
typically acknowledged the state's dependence on His favor.65 The
New Jersey Constitution of 1776, for example, decreed that "no per-
son shall ever, within this Colony, be deprived of the inestimable privi-
lege of worshipping Almighty God in a manner agreeable, to the
dictates of his own conscience." 66 The state's constitution of 1844, in
addition to repeating that language, began:
We, the people of the State of New Jersey, grateful to Almighty God for
the civil and religious liberty which He hath so long permitted us to
enjoy, and looking to Him for a blessing upon our endeavors to secure
and transmit the same unimpaired to succeeding generations do ordain
and establish this Constitution.67
In addition, while the federal Constitution is silent on a person's
religious duties, some early state constitutions are not. The Massachu-
setts Constitution of 1780, for example, states that "[i]t is the right as
well as the Duty of all men in society, publicly, and at stated seasons
to worship the Supreme Being."' 68  Virginia's 1776 Constitution notes
that "it is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance,
love, and charity towards each other."' 69 Furthermore, while the fed-
eral Constitution forbids religious tests, 70 several early state constitu-
64. For an overview that presents developments in the states as a movement toward the
United States Constitution's model of church-state relations, see A. STOKES, supra note 31, at
151-69.
65. The United States Constitution, as originally ratified, refers to religion only once: article
VI, § 3 bans religious tests as a qualification for "any Office or public Trust under the United
States." Although some opponents of the Constitution during the ratification debates alleged
that the new government would imperil the rights of conscience or establish a national church,
others criticized the Constitution for failing to establish tests that would exclude Jews, Catholics,
and pagans from federal office. See L. LEVY, supra note 31, ch. 3.
66. N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XVIII, reprinted in 5 F. THORPE, supra note 53, at 2597.
67. N.J. CONST. of 1844, preamble and art. I, § 3, reprinted in 5 F. THORPE, supra note 53, at
2599.
68. MAsS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. III.
69. VA. CONST. of 1776, art. I, § 16 (Declaration of Rights), reprinted in 7 F. THORPE, supra
note 53, at 3814.
70. See supra note 65.
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tions retained them, either prescribing beliefs to be held by office-
holders or prohibiting clergymen from holding political office.7 1
Taken altogether, what these provisions indicate is that although
the states moved to eliminate formal religious establishments, they did
not do so to secularize society. Rather, the states dispensed with gov-
ernmental coercion in religious matters largely out of religious faith, to
permit men to respond freely to the call of God's grace. Indeed, the
predominance of Baptists and members of other dissenting sects in the
forefront of those promoting the separation of church and state under-
scores the point that the concern was not to circumscribe the influence
of religion in society or to prevent religious influences on government,
but rather to prevent governmental intrusion in the religious sphere.72
Given this orientation, it is not surprising that disestablishment did
not, at least through much of the nineteenth century, result in govern-
mental neutrality between religion and irreligion. Rather, the prevail-
ing assumption was that government should continue to be supportive
of religion in general and of Protestant Christianity in particular,
although this support would not take the form of direct financial aid.73
The preambles to state constitutions of the nineteenth century reflect
this assumption.74 So too does political and legal practice during the
early nineteenth century. 75 This was true even in Virginia, where-
despite Madison's and Jefferson's efforts to secure a strict separation of
church and state-the sects that had opposed assessments thereafter
banded together with their opponents to ensure that government
maintained a legal and political climate conducive to religious
practice.76
Certainly political and judicial practice in other states followed this
pattern. State courts continued to recognize Christianity as part of the
common law and to sustain convictions for blasphemy when speakers
disparaged Christian beliefs.77 Similarly, despite acknowledging the
religious character of Sunday-closing laws, state courts consistently
71. For a representative provision requiring adherence to specified doctrinal tenets, see N.C.
CONST. art. XXXII (1776, amended 1835); for a representative provision banning clergy from
holding public office, see S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXI, reprinted in 6 F. THORPE, supra note 53,
at 3253. An overview of religious tests and their use is provided by C. ANTIEAU, supra note 11,
at 100-19.
72. For a sympathetic discussion of this perspective, see W. MILLER, supra note 31, at
153-224.
73. Id. at 232-34.
74. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
75. The analysis here depends heavily on C. ANTIEAU, supra note 11, and W. TORPEY,
JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA (1948).
76. See T. BUCKLEY, supra note 31, at 181-82.
77. See, e.g., Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 393 (Pa. 1824).
Vol. 64:73, 1989
Church and State in the States
upheld them. As a state judge noted in one case, "the Christian Sun-
day may be protected from desecration by such laws as the legislature
in its wisdom may deem necessary. ' 78 Thus law became a mechanism
for enforcing the prevailing (Protestant) consensus and for protecting
religiously based practices.
B. The Clash Over Religion and the Schools in New York
L History of the Common-Schools Movement
If disputes over religious establishments supplied the initial impetus
for the states to address church-state relations in their constitutions,
conflict over education provided the second. This conflict arose with
the widespread development of systems of free public schools in the
states.7 9 In the late 1770's, when the first state constitutions were
adopted, the New England states--especially Massachusetts-had
long-established systems of public education. 0 Yet New England was
the exception, not the rule. Elsewhere, public education was rudimen-
tary at best, and until the 1800's other states were slow to follow Mas-
sachusetts' lead.81 Building on some tentative attempts to create
public school systems during the early decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury, educational reformers in the 1830's launched what came to be
known as the common-school movement.82 Their campaign to pro-
mote the establishment of publicly controlled and funded schools
throughout the nation met with extraordinary success. "By 1865 all
the states outside the South had achieved or were on the threshold of
establishing universal, tax-supported, free common schooling."8 3
The very success of this movement, however, forced educators and
governmental officials to confront difficult questions about the charac-
ter and aims of public education. Of particular importance was the
question of the place that religion should occupy in the newly founded
public schools. Initially the public schools reflected the Protestant
cultural consensus that prevailed in America during the early nine-
78. Neuendorif v. Duryea, 69 N.Y. 557, 563 (1877).
79. The major works on the development of public education in America are L. CREMIN,
THE AMERICAN COMMON SCHOOL: AN HISTORICAL CONCEPTION (1951); L. CREMIN,
AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, 1783-1876 (1980) [hereinafter L.
CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION]. For a concise treatment of the crucial period of expansion of
public education, see F. BINDER, THE AGE OF THE COMMON SCHOOL, 1830-1865 (1974).
80. L. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION, supra note 79, ch. 5.
81. Id. at 157-63.
82. F. BINDER, supra note 79, at 23, 29-54.
83. Id. at 161.
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teenth century.14  In giving a religious orientation to the public
schools, school officials merely were continuing practices found in the
private schools that had dominated American education prior to the
common-school movement.8 5 They also were responding to the pub-
lic's expectation that the schools would undertake to inculcate moral-
ity as well as to transmit knowledge.8 6 Indeed, given the religious
character of the American populace, the reliance on religious means to
serve that purpose was consistent with widely shared beliefs about the
relation between religion and morality. 87 In any event, religious exer-
cises were prevalent in the early public schools, with teachers leading
students in prayer, and students daily reading aloud from the King
James version of the Bible.88 More generally, a Protestant Christian
perspective permeated the curriculum, from the materials used in
teaching reading to the interpretation given to religious conflicts in
modem European history.89
Initially, given the religious homogeneity of most communities, this
"Protestantizing" of public education occasioned little controversy-
or at least promoted acquiescence rather than protest. But the situa-
tion changed dramatically with the immigration of large numbers of
Catholics to America during the 1830's and 1840's.9° These new
Americans rejected the prevailing Protestant ethos of the public
schools. In particular, they objected that the religious observances in
the public schools were contrary to their religious convictions and that
the allegedly one-sided history taught in the schools tended to pro-
mote hostility toward the Catholic Church and prejudice against
Catholics.9"
84. On the Protestant religious character of early public schools, see R. CULVER, HORACE
MANN AND RELIGION IN THE MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1929); L. PFEFFER, supra
note 31, at 321, 338-42; J. PRATT, RELIGION, POLITICS, AND DIVERSITY: THE CHURCH-STATE
THEME IN NEW YORK STATE HISTORY ch. V11 (1967).
85. L. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION, supra note 79, at 24-34, 39-49.
86. J. PRATT, supra note 84, at 158-59.
87. L. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION, supra note 79, at 19-100; see also J. PRATT, supra
note 84, at 164-65.
88. V. LANNIE, PUBLIC MONEY AND PAROCHIAL EDUCATION: BISHOP HUGHES,
GOVERNOR SEWARD, AND THE NEW YORK SCHOOL CONTROVERSY 1-5 (1968).
89. Id. at 5-6.
90. For an overview of Catholic immigration and Protestant reactions, see R. BILLINGTON,
THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE, 1800-1860 (1938).
91. This is reflected in the pronouncements of the Catholic hierarchy. The American bishops
attending the Fourth Provincial Council in 1840, for example, concluded that "[t]hey could not
conscientiously permit Catholic attendance at schools which they considered a danger to the
religious faith of their children." V. LANNIE, supra note 88, at 5.
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2. The Situation in New York
Catholic opposition to the Protestant orientation of public schools
was particularly intense in New York.92 When the New York legisla-
ture authorized establishment of public schools throughout the state in
1812 and 1813, New York was relatively homogeneous religiously.
Thus the pervasive Protestantism of the schools occasioned no com-
ment. Rather quickly, however, the religious composition of the state
changed: while in 1815 there were only 13,000 Catholics in the diocese
of New York (which included the entire state plus part of New
Jersey), eleven years later the number had swelled to an estimated
150,000, with 25,000 in New York City.93 The influx of Catholics
raised questions about the educational system in the state. On the one
hand, despite the requirements of church doctrine, the poverty of the
Catholic Church in America did not permit the immediate institution
of a system of parochial schools.94 On the other hand, the Protestant
religious exercises and curriculum posed a barrier to the integration of
Catholics into the public schools. Therefore, Catholic children often
did not attend any school.95
This uneasy situation flared into open conflict in 1840 when Gover-
nor William Seward, a Whig, concerned both about the educational
plight of Catholic children and about the success of the Democratic
Party among the immigrant population, proposed "the establishment
of schools in which [the children of foreigners] may be instructed by
teachers speaking the same language with themselves and professing
the same faith."9 6 Seward's proposal of public funding for parochial
schools-language was not an issue, since most of the Catholic immi-
grants were Irish-prompted an immediate response from the Catho-
lic Church, which submitted a petition for funding to the Common
Council of New York City.9 7 The Council, however, rejected the
request as a violation of constitutional principle.9" Undaunted, the
Catholic Church continued its campaign for funding under the leader-
ship of Bishop John Hughes, who conducted mass meetings at which
92. This discussion of the conflict in New York relies on R. BILLINGTON, supra note 90; V.
LANNIE, supra note 88; J. PRATT, supra note 84, chs. VII-IX; D. RAVITCH, THE GREAT
SCHOOL WARS (1974).
93. The figures, based on diocesan records, are reported by J. PRATT, supra note 84, at
169-70.
94. As of 1840, there were only about two hundred Catholic schools in the United States. A.
STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 229 (revised ed. 1964).
95. V. LANNIE, supra note 88, at 21; see also J. PRATT, supra note 84, at 175.
96. J. PRATT, supra note 84, at 175.
97. V. LANNIE, supra note 88, at 29-50.
98. Id. at 46-50; see also J. PRATT, supra note 84, at 176-77.
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he lambasted the public schools, insisting that they were in reality tax-
supported Protestant schools. Simple justice, Bishop Hughes pro-
claimed, demanded that Catholic schools share equally in the revenues
from education taxes.99
Not surprisingly, Bishop Hughes' demands and his rhetoric alarmed
many partisans of the public schools and activated nativist senti-
ment. " In 1842, a bill was introduced in the New York Assembly
which would have allowed each district in New York City to maintain
its own religious orientation, and permitted funding for Catholic paro-
chial schools in districts where Catholics were a majority.10' Instead
of passing this bill, however, the legislature adopted an amended ver-
sion that prohibited public funding of any school in New York City in
which "any religious sectarian doctrine or tenet shall be taught, incul-
cated, or practiced." 1
0 2
Faced with tensions arising out of religious diversity, the legislature
responded by restricting the teaching of sectarian views in public
schools rather than by incorporating parochial schools into the public
school system. When New York ratified a new constitution in 1846, it
constitutionalized its ban on the use of the common school fund for
other than the common schools."13 The constitution of 1894, adopted
following the expansion of the system of Catholic parochial schools
and a period of intense debate over their funding, emphatically prohib-
ited funding schools "under the control or direction of any religious
denomination, or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is
taught."1°4
3. Implications of the New York Schools Controversy
Like the story of the struggle for religious liberty in Virginia, the
conflict over religion and education in New York is important because
of its implications for understanding state constitutional development.
First, although the militancy of Bishop Hughes and the size of the
state's Catholic population served to intensify the conflict, the contro-
versy in New York was hardly unique. During the nineteenth century
the issue of education emerged as the flashpoint for conflict between
Protestants and Catholics in a number of states.'0 5 Second, as in New
99. V. LANNIE, supra note 88, chs. 3-4.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 212.
102. Id. at 233.
103. N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. IX.
104. N.Y. CONST. of 1894, art. IX, § 4.
105. For a general summary of this conflict, see A. STOKES, supra note 31, chs. 9 & 15.
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York, the emergence of the issue provided the occasion for the states
to adopt new constitutional provisions dealing with religion and
education. 106
Third, again as in New York, this response took the form of a con-
stitutional ban on aid to parochial schools. Often, a prohibition of
religious practices in schools receiving public funds also was added.
Typically the bans were couched in language which was emphatic and
all-inclusive. Washington's Declaration of Rights, for example, man-
dates that "[n]o public money or property shall be appropriated for or
applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the sup-
port of any religious establishment."' 107 The Washington constitu-
tion's education article requires that "[a]ll schools maintained or
supported wholly or in part by the public funds shall be forever free
from sectarian control or influence."' 0 8
Fourth, the adoption of these new provisions illustrates the inter-
play of intrastate factors, horizontal federalism, and national influ-
ences in state constitutional development.10 9 Some states established
bans on aid to religious schools and on religious observances in pub-
licly funded institutions to resolve conflicts similar to the one that
occurred in New York.110 Other states, mindful of the corrosive
effects of religious conflicts, adopted similar constitutional provisions
in order to forestall them. I In some religiously homogeneous states,
aid to parochial education never emerged as a serious issue, but
because the sentiments expressed were congenial, the states nonethe-
less borrowed the constitutional language banning such aid from sister
states.112 Moreover, in those states admitted to the Union after the
Civil War, adoption of constitutional provisions banning aid to sectar-
106. Id. at 271. In addition to New York's provisions, cited above, see ALA. CONST. of 1875,
art. 12, § 8, reprinted in I F. THORPE, supra note 53, at 177; ARK. CONsT. of 1869, art. 9, § 1,
reprinted in 1 F. THORPE, supra note 53, at 322; CAL. CONST. art. 9, § 8; COLO. CONST. art. 9,
§§ 7, 8; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 3; KAN. CONST. of 1855, art. 7, § 2, reprinted in 2 F. THORPE,
supra note 53, at 1189; MAss. CONSr. of 1780, art. XVIII (amended 1855), reprinted in 3 F.
THORPE, supra note 53, at 1918; MINN. CONST. art. 8, § 3; N.D. CONST. art. 8, §§ 1, 5; OHIO
CoNsT. art. VI, § 2; OR. CONST. art. I, § 5; PA. CONST. of 1874, art. X, § 2; WASH. CONST. art.
I, § 11 (1889, amended 1957); WYO. CONST. art. I, § 19.
107. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 (1889, amended 1957).
108. Id. art. IX, § 4.
109. On the operation of horizontal federalism in state constitutional development, see Tarr
& Porter, supra note 23, at 9-12.
110. See. eg., MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XVIII (amended 1855), reprinted in 3 F. THORPE,
supra note 53, at 1918.
111. See, eg., NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11.
112. See, eg., ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. 12, § 8, reprinted in 1 F. THORPE, supra note 53, at
177.
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ian institutions was demanded by Congress as a condition of
admission.' 13
Finally, whatever the factors prompting particular states to take a
constitutional position on the relation between religion and education,
the important point, as Stokes has noted, is that: "From 1844 on, all
states amending their constitutions, and new states when admitted to
the Union (except West Virginia, which later corrected the omission),
decreed in their fundamental laws against any diversion of public
funds to denominational purposes."'
' 14
C. Constitutional History and Constitutional Interpretation
Several conclusions may be drawn from the analyses of the two
great periods of state constitution-making of church-state relations.
First, and most obviously, while the relationship between church and
state under the federal Constitution was fixed during the founding
period and has not since been altered, the state experience has been
very different. The states have amended and revised their constitu-
tions in recognition of changing views, exemplified by the abolition of
religious establishments, and in response to the emergence of new
church-state issues, as in the case of aid to parochial schools. From
this, it follows that even if one seeks to interpret state constitutions in
the light of original intention,' 15 one must look beyond the late eight-
eenth century and the perspectives of that era to understand state con-
stitutional guarantees.
Second, the constitutional guarantees in many states reflect their
origin in specific disputes about the relationship between church and
state. Thus the language found in state constitutions tends to be con-
siderably more concrete and more specific than that found in the fed-
eral document. Furthermore, because they have roots in particular
disputes, the state provisions have characteristically been phrased in
113. This requirement is discussed in the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 219-20 (1948).
114. A. STOKES, supra note 94, at 271.
115. Debate about the viability and desirability of constitutional interpretation based on the
"original intention" of the founders has been intense in recent years. For widely differing
perspectives on how to interpret the federal Constitution, see S. BARBER, ON WHAT THE
CONSTITUTION MEANS (1984); R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1977); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); G. JACOBSOHN, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE DECLINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ASPIRATION (1986); Murphy, Constitutional
Interpretation: The Art of Historian, Magician, or Statesman? 87 YALE L.J. 1752 (1978).
The sole attempt to consider what this literature offers for the interpretation of state
constitutions is Linde, E. Pluribus- Constitutional Theory and State Courts, in DEVELOPMENTS,
supra note 2, at 273.
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language aimed at the specific evils which brought them forth. This
accounts, for example, for the emphasis on "no aid" and on freedom
of worship in the states' early religion guarantees. Moreover, because
of their origins in concrete disputes, state provisions represent consid-
ered constitutional judgments about contentious church-state issues
and, as such, should lend themselves to direct application with only
minimal interpretation.
Third, despite interstate variation, one can detect some common
features in the treatment of church-state issues in state constitutions.
Most state constitutions acknowledge the existence of God in their
preambles, and some encourage citizens to worship Him. Almost all
state constitutions contain emphatic prohibitions on favoritism toward
a particular religion and on aid to religious groups and institutions,
frequently premising these bans on the importance of avoiding intru-
sion by government into the realm of freedom of conscience. Most
state constitutions also seek to maintain a separation of church and
state in the field of education, in part by safeguarding public funds for
public schools and preventing their diversion to sectarian institutions
and purposes, in part by banning religious practices in schools receiv-
ing state funds. Nevertheless, some states, particularly during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, sought to ensure that these
prohibitions would not interfere with traditional practices such as
Bible reading in public schools by inserting provisions either permit-
ting or requiring such practices.116
The adoption of these last provisions is interesting, for it highlights
the incompatibility of many traditional practices with state constitu-
tional principles. In doing so, it directs attention to how the states
have-and should have-interpreted their state guarantees. It is to
this question that this discussion now turns.
III. INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEES117
A. State Aid, to Religious Schools
Almost all state constitutions expressly prohibit direct-aid to
schools which are controlled by religious denominations or which
teach religious doctrines.1 8 Given the clarity of the constitutional
language, few cases have arisen involving direct aid to religious
116. See eg., MIss. CONST. of 1890, art. lII, § 18: "The rights hereby secured shall not be
construed... to exclude the Holy Bible from use in any public school of this state."
117. This section draws upon material presented in Tarr, supra note 3.
118. For a survey of these provisions, see Collins, supra note 10, at 2500.
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schools. When the issue has been raised, state courts have almost
unanimously struck down such aid as unconstitutional." 9 The sole
exception to this pattern of invalidation, a 1913 Massachusetts ruling
upholding aid to sectarian colleges and universities, was promptly
overturned by a constitutional amendment outlawing such aid.'2 °
Particularly since World War II, however, a large number of state
cases have arisen focusing on the constitutionality of indirect aid to
religious schools and their students, such as providing transportation
or textbooks to children attending nonpublic schools. 2 ' The United
States Supreme Court has ruled that such programs do not transgress
the first amendment.'22 The Court also has indicated, however, that
the federal Constitution does not require states that furnish textbooks
and transportation to public school students likewise make such aid
available to children attending nonpublic schools. 2 ' Therefore, such
aid programs have been subject to challenge under state constitutions.
As the preceding section demonstrated, most states adopted
strongly worded constitutional prohibitions on aid to religious schools
in the wake of the Catholic Church's efforts to secure funding for its
schools.' 24 Given the emphatic and comprehensive "no aid" language
found in most state constitutions and the historical circumstances
leading to its adoption, one may well conclude that indirect aid to
parochial schools also should be viewed as constitutionally suspect.
Some states, recognizing the implication of their constitutional
prohibitions, have revised their constitutions specifically to authorize
such aid. Thus in 1947, after the New Jersey Court of Errors and
Appeals (as the state's supreme court was then known) had upheld a
program of bus transportation for parochial school students,' 25 the
state included an authorization for such programs in its new constitu-
119. Wright v. School Dist., 151 Kan. 485, 99 P.2d 737 (1940); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co.
v. City of Atchison, 47 Kan. 712, 28 P. 1000 (1892); Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist., 361
Mo. 121, 260 S.W.2d 573 (1953); Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 163 S.W.2d 609 (1941); State
ex rel. Pub. School Dist. v. Taylor, 122 Neb. 454, 240 N.W. 573 (1932); Murrow Indian Orphans
Home v. Childers, 197 Okla. 249, 171 P.2d 600 (1946); Collins v. Kephart, 271 Pa. 428, 117 A.
440 (1921); Nance v. Johnson, 84 Tex. 401, 19 S.W. 559 (1892).
Many of these cases are discussed in C. ANTIEAU, supra note 11, at 24-36.
120. MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVI, § 2 (adopted in response to Re Opinion of the
Justices, 214 Mass. 599, 102 N.E. 464 (1913)).
121. See infra notes 122-47 and accompanying text.
122. On provision of bus transportation, see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); on
the loaning of textbooks, see Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
123. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
124. See supra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
125. Everson v. Board of Educ., 133 N.J.L. 350, 44 A.2d 333 (1945).
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tion to prevent any judicial backsliding from that position. 26 Simi-
larly, after the New York and Wisconsin high courts struck down
school transportation programs, 2 7 amendments were adopted which
authorized their reinstitution.1 28
Most state constitutions, however, neither expressly authorize nor
prohibit providing bus transportation or loaning textbooks to students
or providing other forms of indirect aid to nonpublic schools. Thus
state courts have had to determine whether the general constitutional
bans on aid to religious institutions likewise prohibit programs of indi-
rect aid. In ruling on these programs, state courts have divided almost
evenly. For the most part, these differing outcomes cannot be attrib-
uted to differences in constitutional language, because the "no aid"
language in most state constitutions is clear and emphatic. Rather, the
variation among state courts seems to reflect the willingness-or
unwillingness-of the justices to read the applicable state provisions as
independent constitutional judgments on the permissibility of aid to
religious institutions.
The state courts that have upheld the challenged programs have
tended to assume, often without supporting analysis, that the relevant
state provisions impose no greater restriction than is imposed by the
first amendment.1 29 In addition, many of these courts have claimed
that the challenged programs benefitted the schoolchild rather than
126. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, 3.
127. Judd v. Board of Educ., 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938); Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17
Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962).
128. The state rulings in Judd and Reynolds were overturned by N.Y. CONsT. art. XI, § 4
and Wis. CONsT. art. I, § 21, respectively.
129. State rulings upholding the loaning of textbooks to students in sectarian schools include:
Borden v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1928); Chance v. Mississippi
State Textbook Rating & Purchasing Bd., 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1941); Opinion of the
Justices, 109 N.H. 578, 258 A.2d 343 (1969); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228
N.E.2d 791, 281 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1967), aff'd, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Bowerman v. O'Connor, 104
R.I. 519, 247 A.2d 82 (1968).
State rulings upholding provision of transportation to students in sectarian schools include:
Everson v. Board of Educ., 133 N.J.L. 350, 44 A.2d 333 (1945), aff'd, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Bowker
v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. 2d 653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946); Snyder v. Town of Newtown, 147 Conn.
374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 299 (1961); Board of Educ. v. Bakalis, 54
Ill. 2d 448, 299 N.E.2d 737 (1973); Nicholas v. Henry, 301 Ky. 434, 191 S.W.2d 930 (1945);
Americans United Inc. as Protestants v. Independent School Dist., 288 Minn. 196, 179 N.W.2d
146 (1970), appeal dismissed, 403 U.S. 945 (1971); Honohan v. Holt, 17 Ohio Misc. 57, 244
N.E.2d 537 (1968); Rhoades v. School Dist., 424 Pa. 202, 226 A.2d 53, appeal dismissed, 389
U.S. 11, cert. denied sub nom. Worrell v. Matters, 389 U.S. 846 (1967); State ex rel. Hughes v.
Board of Educ., 154 W. Va. 107, 174 S.E.2d 711 (1970), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 403
U.S. 944 (1971), overruled, Janasiewicz v. Board of Educ., 299 S.E.2d 34 (W. Va. 1982).
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the religious school, invoking the so-called child-benefit theory. 130
Alternatively, they have maintained that the valid public purposes
served by the programs-ensuring the safety of schoolchildren in
transportation cases, or providing better education in textbook cases-
justified their continuation.
Representative of these decisions is Snyder v. Town of Newtown, 3'
in which the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a transportation pro-
gram against constitutional challenge. The Connecticut Constitution
provides that no one shall be compelled "to join or support, nor be
classed with, or associated to, any congregation, church or religious
association" '132 and that the school fund shall not be diverted "to any
other use than the encouragement and support of public, or common
schools."' 3 3 Nevertheless, the Connecticut court chose to emphasize
the public purpose served by the program rather than the constitu-
tional language, asserting that "a statute which serves a public purpose
is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited
number of persons."' 34 In rejecting the contention that the program
violated the constitutional prohibition on aid to religion, the court
simply asserted that "in light of our history and policy, [the program]
cannot be said to compel support of any church."135
In contrast, the courts that have invalidated programs of indirect
aid have been more attuned to the differences in language between fed-
eral and state constitutions and to the differing historical experiences
underlying their adoption.' 36 A model of the sort of independent con-
stitutional analysis which should occur under state constitutions is
130. The "child-benefit theory" was first enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in
Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930). In Cochran, the Court upheld a
state law that authorized providing free textbooks to children attending church-related schools.
Because the establishment clause had not at that point been incorporated, see supra note 22 and
accompanying text, the constitutional challenge to Louisiana's law was based on the claim that
the program involved spending public funds for a private purpose. The Court based its analysis
on the theory that "the state may extend certain welfare aid to students attending church-related
schools in situations where general aid to the parochial schools themselves would be
unconstitutional." See LaNoue, The Child Benefit Theory Revisited: Textbook, Transportation,
and Medical Care, 13 J. PUB. L. 76, 79 (1964).
131. 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960); see also C. ANTIEAU, supra note 11, at 33.
132. CONN. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
133. Id. art. VIII, § 2.
134. Snyder, 161 A.2d at 774-75.
135. Id. at 779.
136. State rulings striking down the loaning of textbooks include: California Teachers Ass'n.
v. Riles, 29 Cal. 3d 794, 632 P.2d 953, 176 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1981); Bloom v. School Comm., 376
Mass. 35, 379 N.E.2d 578 (1978); Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1974 PA 242, 394
Mich. 41, 228 N.W.2d 772 (1975); Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1111 (1975); Gaffney v. State Dept. of Educ., 192 Neb. 358, 220 N.W.2d 550 (1974);
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found in Gaffney v. State Department of Education.137  Gaffney
involved the constitutionality of a Nebraska law authorizing the loan-
ing of textbooks to pupils attending nonpublic schools. The Nebraska
Supreme Court, eschewing the tripartite analysis developed by the
United States Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman,138 instead
focused on Nebraska's constitutional prohibition of any "appropria-
tion in aid of any sectarian institution or any educational institution
not owned and controlled by the state." 139 The clarity of this lan-
guage, the court insisted, made interpretation unnecessary, and its
broad sweep admitted of no exceptions."4 Indeed, the records of the
convention which drafted the provision indicated that a major aim of
the delegates was to devise a precise prohibition which would prevent
sectarian conflict over the funding of church-related schools. 141 The
court therefore concluded that the law violated the state's constitution.
Other state courts have likewise looked to the language of their state
constitutions in justifying the development of an independent constitu-
tional position. The California Supreme Court, for example, con-
cluded that the state constitution's ban on expenditures for "any
sectarian purpose"" was designed to prevent the state from providing
benefits to sectarian schools that furthered their educational purpose
and on that basis struck down a textbook loan program. 143 Similarly,
the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that, given the clear import of
the constitution's "no aid" language, 1" if the state's founders had
wished to permit the state to provide transportation to students
attending parochial schools, they would have included a provision
Dickman v. School Dist., 232 Or. 238, 366 P.2d 533 (1961), cerL denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962);
McDonald v. School Bd., 90 S.D. 599, 246 N.W.2d 93 (1976).
State rulings striking down the provision of transportation, which have not been overturned by
constitutional amendments, include: Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961), cert
denied and appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 517 (1962); State ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 36 Del. 181, 172
A. 835 (1934); Spears v. Honda, 51 Haw. 1, 449 P.2d 130 (1969); Epeldi v. Engelking, 94 Idaho
390, 488 P.2d 860 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972); Board of Educ. v. Antone, 384 P.2d
911 (Okla. 1963); Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist., 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949).
137. 192 Neb. 358, 220 N.W.2d 550 (1974).
138. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the United States Supreme Court proposed
a three-pronged test for determining whether a law violated the establishment clause: (1) does the
law have a secular purpose? (2) is its primary effect to advance religion? and (3) does it foster an
excessive entanglement between government and religion?
139. NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11.
140. Gaffney, 220 N.W.2d at 553.
141. Id. at 553-54.
142. CAL. CONsT. art. XVI, § 5; cf id art. IX, § 8.
143. California Teachers Ass'n. v. Riles, 29 Cal. 3d 794, 632 P.2d 953, 176 Cal. Rptr. 300
(1981).
144. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1.
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expressly indicating that intent.145 Finally, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, noting that a challenged textbook loan pro-
gram aided sectarian schools in carrying out their essential educa-
tional function, held that the program violated the amendment,
adopted following its 1913 decision, which ruled out the "use" of
money for "maintaining or aiding" sectarian schools. 146
Considering the cases as a whole, the rulings banning indirect aid
seem more faithful to the purposes and history of state constitutional
guarantees than do the rulings upholding aid. 147 If the United States
Supreme Court decides that forms of indirect aid currently prohibited
are compatible with the establishment clause-not a farfetched possi-
bility given the divisions on the Court and recent changes in the
Court's personnel 148 -one can expect renewed litigation under state
constitutions. 149 Should this occur, state courts will have both the
opportunity and the constitutional basis to chart an independent
course.
B. Religious Practices in Public Schools
Many state constitutions not only prohibit governmental expendi-
tures for sectarian religious purposes but also expressly forbid sectar-
ian control or influence in schools supported by state funds.' 50 These
provisions serve two purposes. First, they prevent the public funding
of parochial schools. Second, as the review of the conflict in New
York suggests, the provisions forbidding sectarian influence also serve
to address Catholic concerns about the prevalence of Protestant reli-
gious practices and inculcating Protestant doctrine in the public
schools.'' More generally, several state constitutions guarantee an
absolute freedom of worship and forbid government from compelling
attendance at a place of worship. Typical is the Constitution of Wash-
ington, which safeguards "[a]bsolute freedom of conscience in all mat-
145. Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932, 944 (Alaska 1961).
146. Bloom v. School Comm., 376 Mass. 35, 379 N.E.2d 578 (1978).
147. This conclusion is based on both the emphatic prohibitions found in state constitutions
and the history previously reviewed regarding the adoption of these prohibitions. See supra notes
79-114 and accompanying text.
148. In recent school-aid cases the United States Supreme Court either has upheld the
provision against constitutional challenges, as in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), or has
divided sharply over its permissibility, as in School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). Because
Justice Powell, who provided the decisive vote in the latter case, has retired and been replaced by
Justice Kennedy, the Court's willingness to adhere'to its position in Ball must be questioned.
149. Tarr, Religion Under State Constitutions, 496 ANNALS 65, 74-75 (1988).
150. For a summary of those provisions, see Collins, supra note 10, at 2500.
151. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
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ters of religious sentiment, belief, and worship," '1 52 decrees that "[n]o
public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any
religious worship, exercise or instruction," '153 and mandates that "[a]ll
schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by the public funds
shall be forever free from sectarian control or influence." '54 Together,
these provisions provide a clear basis for invalidating religious prac-
tices in the public schools and for ensuring that state government does
not interfere with freedom of belief and worship.
At least initially, however, restrictive state provisions had little
effect. In those states where constitutional guarantees of freedom of
worship and belief antedated the establishment of systems of public
education, the guarantees did not prevent the institution of Bible read-
ing and daily prayer in the public schools nor did they curtail the per-
vasive (nonmonetary) support for Protestant Christianity.1 55 In those
states which banned sectarian influences in state-funded schools, the
constitutional guarantees typically did not eliminate religious practices
as standard elements in the public school curriculum. 56 Nonetheless,
adopting these constitutional principles, despite continuation of prac-
tices incompatible with them, was important because it furnished a
weapon for litigants who would later challenge the states' sponsorship
of religious practices.
The challenge to religious practices in the public schools began dur-
ing the nineteenth century. Five state courts anticipated the Supreme
Court's analysis in School District v. Schempp 157 by striking down
Bible reading in the schools under their state constitutions. 158 The
Florida and New Jersey Supreme Courts, despite upholding Bible
152. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
153. Id.
154. Id. art. IX, § 4.
155. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. The frequency of litigation, described infra
notes 158-65 and accompanying.text, is itself testimony to the widespread character of the
practice.
156. In the 1894 constitutional convention in New York, for example, the same committee
that reported an amendment prohibiting sectarianism in the public school system and forbidding
the expenditure of public funds to "propagate denominational tenets" assured the delegates that
it was not intended thereby to "interfere with the reading of the Bible in public schools." J.
PRATr, supra note 84, at 272.
157. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
158. Rulings prior to Schempp which either struck down Bible reading in public schools or
upheld laws banning it include: People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Educ., 245 Il1. 334, 92 N.E. 251
(1910); Herold v. Parish Bd. of School Directors, 136 La. 1034, 68 So. 116 (1915); State ex rel.
Freeman v. Scheve, 65 Neb. 853, 91 N.W. 846 (1902); Board of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211
(1872); State ex reL Weiss v. District Bd., 76 Wis. 177, 44 N.W. 967 (1890).
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reading programs, 59 similarly ruled that the distribution of copies of
the Gideon Bible to students involved an unconstitutional preference
for a particular religious sect." 6 The New Mexico Supreme Court for-
bade distribution of other religious literature on similar grounds. 61
Most state courts, however, summarily rejected constitutional chal-
lenges to Bible reading and other sectarian observances in the public
schools.' 62 To do so, these courts were forced to deny that the Bible
was sectarian, arguing that its "adopt[ion] by one or more denomina-
tions as authentic ... or inspired, cannot make it a sectarian book.' '163
They also had to contend that use of a version of the Bible favored by
a particular sect did not constitute governmental endorsement of or
preference for a particular religion."6 Finally, these courts had to
deny that school prayer and Bible reading transformed the classroom
into a place of worship, insisting that the constitutional ban on com-
pelled attendance at a placed of worship applied only to places where
people met for that express purpose. 165
These assertions, unconvincing though they are, demonstrate the
commitment many state courts had to upholding Bible reading in the
schools. 166 Indeed, even after the United States Supreme Court struck
159. The Florida Supreme Court upheld a Bible reading program in Chamberlin v. Dade
County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 143 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1962), vacated, 374 U.S. 487 (1963), rev'd,
377 U.S. 402 (1964), and the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a similar program in Doremus
v. Board of Educ., 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
160. Rulings striking down distribution of the Gideon Bible to students in public school
include: Brown v. Orange County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 128 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1960), aff'd, 155
So.2d 371 (Fla. 1963); Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d 857, cert. denied, 348 U.S.
816 (1954).
161. In Miller v. Cooper, 56 N.M. 355, 244 P.2d 520 (1952), the New Mexico Supreme Court
forbade the distribution of Presbyterian religious literature in the state's public schools.
162. Rulings upholding Bible reading in the public schools include: People ex rel. Vollmar v.
Stanley, 81 Colo. 397, 255 P. 610 (1927), overruled, Conrad v. Denver, 656 P.2d 662 (Colo.
1982); Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 143 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1962), vacated,
374 U.S. 487 (1963), rev'd, 337 U.S. 402 (1964); Wilkerson v. City of Rome, 152 Ga. 762, 110
S.E. 895 (1927); Moore v. Monroe, 63 Iowa 367, 20 N.W. 475 (1884); Billard v. Board of Educ.,
69 Kan. 53, 76 P. 422 (1904); Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School Dist., 120 Ky. 608, 87 S.W.
792 (1905); Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 376 (1854); Pfeiffer v. Board of Educ., 118 Mich. 560,
77 N.W. 250 (1898); Kaplan v. Independent School Dist., 171 Minn. 142, 214 N.W. 18 (1927);
Doremus v. Board of Educ., 5 N.J. 35, 75 A.2d 880 (1950); Carden v. Bland, 199 Tenn. 665, 288
S.W.2d 718 (1956); Church v. Bullock, 104 Tex. 1, 109 S.W. 115 (1908).
163. Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School Dist., 120 Ky. 608, 87 S.W. 792, 794 (1905).
164. Hackett, 87 S.W. at 794.
165. Church v. Bullock, 104 Tex. 1, 109 S.W. 115 (1908).
166. As Monrad G. Paulsen observed, "[i]nstead of maintaining a 'wall of separation,' many
state courts have upheld enactments benefiting religion by narrow technical readings of their
state constitutions." Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts and First Amendment Freedoms 4
VAND. L. REv. 620, 642 (1951). For a possible explanation of this commitment, see G. TARR,
JUDICIAL IMPACT AND STATE SUPREME COURTS ch. 6 (1977).
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down the practice under the federal Constitution, the Florida Supreme
Court continued to insist that Bible reading was not a religious exer-
cise. 167 Paradoxically, the state courts' opinions upholding Bible read-
ing in the schools also underline the strength of state constitutional
strictures on governmental sponsorship of religious practices. The
clarity of the provisions precluded interpreting them in an accom-
modationist fashion, and state courts thus were forced to misrepresent
the situations they confronted in order to uphold the practices they
favored. Should new issues be presented, involving religious practices
in the public schools or the introduction of religious perspectives into
their curricula, these state constitutional provisions can and should
serve as a barrier to efforts to compromise the secular character of the
public schools.
C. Religious Displays on Public Property
A more difficult question is posed when state sponsorship of reli-
gious practices or displays occurs outside the school context. Because
constitutional restrictions on sectarian influences in public schools do
not apply in such circumstances, state courts must resolve the issues
such sponsorship raises in the light of the state's more general consti-
tutional provisions dealing with church and state.
An important recent issue of state sponsorship is raised by the
states' erection and/or maintenance of religious displays on public
property. Prior to 1984, when the United States Supreme Court ruled
that the inclusion of a nativity scene in a Christmas display on public
property did not violate the establishment clause, 168 the courts in five
states had addressed the issue. In three instances the courts found no
constitutional violation. Over several years, the Oregon Supreme
Court initially upheld and then invalidated the erection in a city park
of a permanent fifty-one-foot-high Latin cross which would be illumi-
nated during the Christmas and Easter seasons, only to reverse itself
once again when the cross was designated as a war memorial and illu-
minated only on patriotic holidays. 69 In a more straightforward fash-
ion, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in 1972 upheld the erection of a
167. Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 160 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1962). For
discussion of the court's justification of this ruling, see G. TARR, supra note 166, at 47-49.
168. The United States Supreme Court upheld inclusion of a creche in a Christmas display on
public property in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
169. Lowe v. City of Eugene, 254 Or. 518, 451 P.2d 117 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042
(1970); see also Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 276 Or. 1007, 558 P.2d 338
(1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977).
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similar cross in a public park, 17' and the Florida Supreme Court in
1967 ruled that a lighted cross could be displayed on the county court-
house each December. 17 1 On the other hand, the Colorado Supreme
Court in 1983 reversed the dismissal of a suit challenging the inclusion
of a creche in Christmas decorations displayed on the steps of the city
and county building, 72 and the California Supreme Court in 1978
struck down the constitutionality of a lighted cross display on Los
Angeles' city hall to commemorate Christmas and Easter.173
In only three of these cases did the state high courts consider
whether the displays violated the states' bills of rights. The Colorado
Supreme Court, maintaining that the state and federal religion guaran-
tees "embod[ied] similar values," 1 74 relied on the tripartite test devel-
oped by the Supreme Court in Lemon "' in interpreting the state
guarantee and concluded that the appellants had shown a prima facie
case of constitutional violation. Yet because this ruling is linked so
closely to the application of federal doctrine, some question exists
regarding its continuing viability in the wake of the United States
Supreme Court's contrary decision in Lynch. 176
In contrast, the Oklahoma and California supreme courts under-
took independent interpretation of their state guarantees, albeit with
conflicting results. Acknowledging that expenditures to support or
benefit a religious sect would violate the state constitution, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court insisted that, despite the city's maintenance
and illumination of the cross, no use of public monies was involved.1 77
Furthermore, the court continued, the display of the cross did not
entail forbidden governmental support for religion, because the com-
mercial setting of the cross "stultif[ied] its symbolism and vitiate[d]
any use, benefit or support for any sect, church, denomination, system
of religion or sectarian institution as such."' 178
Considerably more convincing is the California Supreme Court's
opinion in Fox v. City of Los Angeles. 179 The California court pointed
out that the sectarian religious character of the display in question was
apparent in both the selection of the cross, a symbol particularly perti-
170. Meyer v. Oklahoma City, 496 P.2d 789 (Okla.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 980 (1972).
171. Paul v. Dade County, 202 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1041 (1968).
172. Conrad v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662 (Colo. 1982).
173. Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
174. Conrad, 656 P.2d at 670.
175. See supra note 138.
176. See supra note 168.
177. Meyer v. Oklahoma City, 496 P.2d 789, 792 (Okla.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 980 (1972).
178. Id. at 792-93.
179. 22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
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nent to the Christian religion, and in the efforts of Greek Orthodox
Christians to ensure that the cross would be displayed on their Easter
as well.18  It thus concluded that the state's special recognition of one
religion, at least where others were not similarly recognized, violated
the state's constitutional ban on preference for religious sects."8
By emphasizing the sectarian character of the religious display, the
California Supreme Court left unanswered the question of whether
sponsorship of religious displays in recognition of all religions would
violate the state's constitution. Moving beyond the California context
and the specific issue of religious displays, one might well generalize
the issue: is it valid under state constitutions for the states to recognize
and support religion in general?1" 2 The answer to this question neces-
sarily depends on the specific language in a state's constitution. None-
theless, some general observations and a tentative conclusion are
possible.
First, as noted earlier, the preambles of most contemporary state
constitutions expressly recognize the existence of God, often admitting
the state's dependence on His blessings. Some state constitutions also
acknowledge a duty of religious worship.18 3 Thus, most state constitu-
tions are far from neutral on the question of religious belief.
Second, far more than the analogous provisions in the federal Con-
stitution, the provisions on church and state in state constitutions,
read in the light of the circumstances of their adoption, offer support
for Justice William 0. Douglas's dictum that "we are a religious peo-
ple whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." ' 4 From this
claim Justice Douglas drew the conclusion that "[w]hen the state
encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authori-
ties... it follows the best of our traditions." ' Once again, the lan-
guage and history of state constitutions seem compatible with this
conclusion.
Third, this dual recognition of the religious character of the Ameri-
can populace and of the existence of a supreme being, even when tied
to a duty of religious worship, neither imposes on the states an obliga-
tion to provide financial assistance to religion nor authorizes such sup-
180. Fox, 587 P.2d at 664-65.
181. Id. at 665-66.
182. This would include not only religious displays, such as were at issue in the cases we have
surveyed, but also ceremonial observances, such as was at issue in Marsh v. Chambers, 459 U.S.
966 (1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
183. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
184. Id. at 313-14.
185. Id.
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port. Indeed, many state constitutions, responding to the evils
associated with religious establishments, preclude such support in no
uncertain terms.
Finally, from the foregoing observations it appears that governmen-
tal recognition of religion and religious practices would not violate
most state constitutions as long as this recognition (1) did not entail
favoritism to particular sects or religions, (2) did not involve financial
aid to religion, and (3) did not interfere with the freedom of religious
belief, sentiment, and worship. Whether programs could be devised
which would meet these exacting requirements is a difficult question,
as is whether such programs would run afoul of the establishment
clause of the first amendment.1 86 Nonetheless, the fact that such crite-
ria can be developed underscores once again that state constitutions
tend to incorporate a different perspective on church and state than is
found in the federal Constitution.
IV. THE DESIRABILITY OF A STATE JURISPRUDENCE
OF CHURCH AND STATE
The preceding sections of this Article demonstrate that state consti-
tutional provisions dealing with church and state have been fashioned
out of distinctive historical experiences. Thus reliance on these provi-
sions can lead to different results than would obtain if one relied on the
first amendment as presently interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court. Yet even if it is possible to develop a state jurisprudence of
church and state, is it appropriate and desirable to do so?
Litigants can be expected to answer this question by examining how
state courts, relying on their state constitutions, would likely rule on
various church-state issues and then determine whether those results
are more desirable than the likely results under the first amend-
ment. 187 This is hardly the standard, however, that judges should use
in determining whether or not to base their rulings on state constitu-
tions. For one thing, such a result oriented approach retards, rather
than promotes, the development of state constitutional law. 8 8 More-
186. For an example of a state's attempt to promote the free exercise of religion that did run
afoul of the federal establishment clause, see Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703
(1985).
187. What is "desirable," of course, depends on the perspective of the judge. For a criticism
of this sort of result oriented approach to state constitutional law, see Note, The New Federalism:
Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REv. 297 (1977).
188. For a perceptive discussion of this issue, see Porter, State Supreme Courts and the
Legacy of the Warren Court: Some Old Inquiries for a New Situation, in STATE SUPREME
CouRTs 3 (1982).
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over, for judicial decisions to be defensible, they must be seen as
rooted in judgment rather than in will, and a reliance on state consti-
tutions that is opportunistic rather than principled undermines that
perception. 189 Thus to justify the development of an independent state
law of church and state, we must consider the various standards pro-
posed by jurists and scholars for determining when judges should rely
on state constitutional protections rather than on the federal Constitu-
tion when resolving issues of individual rights.1 90 Examination of
these standards reveals that the development of an independent state
jurisprudence of church and state is not only possible but indeed legiti-
mate and desirable.
The most expansive conception of the role to be accorded state con-
stitutional protections is the "state law first" or "first things first"
approach, which was originally proposed by Justice Hans Linde of the
Oregon Supreme Court 91 and has since been adopted by that court.1
92
Justice Linde argues that judges should always address and resolve
state constitutional challenges to state legislative or executive action
before addressing themselves to federal constitutional issues.'93 This
insistence on looking at state law first logically follows, he contends,
from the relationship of state and federal law in protecting rights. One
cannot determine whether a state has violated the due process or equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment until the state has
completed its actioii, and this includes not only action by the state's
legislative and/or executive branches but also the evaluation by the
state judiciary of the compatibility of their action with state law.194
If a violation of the state's bill of rights is found, then the success of
the state constitutional challenge obviates the need for a court to
189. The classic exposition is found in The Federalist No. 78, where Alexander Hamilton
observes that the judiciary "may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of
its judgments." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 227 (A. Hamilton) (R. Fairfield 2d ed. 1981). For a
recent discussion by a state supreme court justice, see Handler, A Matter of Opinion, 15
RUTGERS LJ. 1 (1983).
190. For a useful recent overview of various approaches to state bills of rights, see Collins &
Galie, supra note 2.
191. For major statements by Linde of this position, see Linde, supra note 2; Linde, supra
note 115; Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering-the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV.
379 (1980). Important analyses of this approach include: Carson, Last Things Last: A
Methodological Approach to Legal Arguments in State Courts, 19 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 641
(1983); Collins, supra note 28.
192. The Oregon Supreme Court endorsed Linde's approach in State v. Kennedy, 295 Or.
260, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983), and Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981).
193. Linde, supra note 2, at 135, 182.
194. Id. at 133, 182-83.
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address itself to federal constitutional issues.1 95 Alternatively, if the
action of the state's legislative and/or executive branches is compatible
with the state constitution, then the state judge must determine its
compatibility with federal constitutional requirements. 196 Because pro-
ponents of the "first things first" approach favor looking initially to
the state constitution whenever a constitutional violation is alleged, it
follows that from this perspective the development of a state jurispru-
dence of church and state is not only permissible but indeed essential
for the state constitution to fulfill the role assigned to it in the Ameri-
can legal system.
A second group of scholars and jurists has concluded that the fed-
eral Constitution should provide the primary protection for civil liber-
ties and that state bills of rights should be viewed as supplementary or
subsidiary."' From this initial point, it follows that state courts must
justify their action when they choose to rely on what is secondary, i.e.,
state constitutional protections, rather than on what is primary, i.e.,
the federal Bill of Rights. The presumption in favor of reliance on
federal law is particularly strong, according to most advocates of this
position, when the United States Supreme Court has provided direc-
tion by ruling on the same question confronting the state court.198 In
such circumstances state judges, even in interpreting provisions of
their state's constitution, should usually be guided by the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of analogous provisions of the
federal document. 199
Yet proponents of this supplementary role for state guarantees of
individual rights recognize that the state protections do have a role to
play. To distinguish those situations in which reliance on the state
constitution is appropriate from those in which it is not, they have
identified various factors or criteria which would justify rejection of
the reasoning used and results reached by the United States Supreme
Court. Despite some variation among these lists, several criteria tend
195. Id. at 133-34.
196. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
197. There is considerable variation in perspective even among those who subscribe to this
viewpoint. Important presentations of this viewpoint include: Pollock, State Constitutions as
Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707 (1983); Developments in the
Law, supra note 1. For commentary on this viewpoint, see Keyser, State Constitutions &
Theories of Judicial Review: Some Variations on a Theme, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1051 (1985).
198. For a trenchant critique of the assumption that state courts should conform their rulings
to those of the Supreme Court, see Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State
Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C.L. REV. 353 (1984).
199. In addition to the article cited supra note 197, see in particular the concurring opinion of
Justice Alan Handler in State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952, 965-67 (1982).
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to show up consistently, among them textual differences between the
federal and state provisions and a distinctive legislative history for the
state provisions which indicates the validity of a broader
interpretation.
If one concludes that the repetition of these factors indicates a con-
sensus about ° their adequacy as a justification for adopting an
independent constitutional position, a state jurisprudence of church
and state is warranted. As the previous discussion revealed, the crite-
rion of textual differences is met by the significant differences in the
specificity and scope of the federal and state guarantees. 2°° Further-
more, the criterion of distinctive legislative history is met by the cir-
cumstances surrounding the adoption of state provisions on
disestablishment, on aid to sectarian schools, and on religious influ-
ences in the public schools. 21  Therefore, even if one acknowledges a
presumption in favor of relying on federal law, ample justification
exists for looking to state constitutions in cases involving church and
state.
Finally, some commentators argue that the societal interests in legal
uniformity, consistency, and comprehensibility should lead state
judges to rely on the federal Constitution, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, rather than on state guarantees of civil liberties.2 2
Frequently what underlies this position is the assumption that state
courts should defer to the Supreme Court and follow the constitu-
tional rulings it announces because of the stature of the Court and the
quality of its analyses. Yet, as former Justice Stanley Mosk of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has insisted, if the justification for deference to
the United States Supreme Court is the quality and consistency of its
rulings, deference to the Court is not warranted when its rulings are
inconsistent and its analyses unconvincing. 20 3 Indeed, an inability on
the Court to provide adequate direction provides a justification for a
200. See supra notes 53-74 & 107-14 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 31-116 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Deukmejian & Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor--judicial Review Under the
California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975 (1979); Hudnut, State Constitutions and
Individual Rights: The Case for Judicial Restraint, 63 DENVER U.L. REV. 85 (1985). For a
judicial endorsement of this viewpoint, see Justice William Clark's opinion in People v. Norman,
14 Cal. 3d 929, 538 P.2d 237, 245-46, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109 (1975), vacated, In re Lance W., 37 Cal.
3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985).
203. Mosk, State Constitutionalism After Warren: Avoiding the Potomac's Ebb and Flow, in
DEVELOPMENTS supra note 2; see also Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552, 494 A.2d 294,
302-03 (1985), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that: "By developing an
interpretation of the New Jersey Constitution that is not irrevocably bound by federal analysis,
we... avoid the necessity of adjusting construction of the state constitution to accommodate
every change in federal analysis of the United States Constitution."
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state court to look to its state constitution for guidance. Certainly the
Supreme Court, by its inconsistent decisions in establishment clause
cases, has forfeited the deference often given to its rulings.2"
V. CONCLUSION
The development of an independent state jurisprudence of church
and state is not only justified but desirable. State constitutional guar-
antees differ markedly in language and form from their federal coun-
terparts. For many states, these differences reflect the process of
constitutional development, in which provisions were adopted over
time to resolve or prevent conflicts over such contentious issues as the
maintenance of religious establishments and aid to sectarian schools.
For others, they reflect a borrowing of provisions from sister states.
Whatever the basis for the differences, the result has been that the
states have constitutionalized a distinctive perspective on the separa-
tion of church and state and on claims of religious liberty. In this era
of the new judicial federalism, it is time-and past time-for state
courts to develop a jurisprudence that is faithful to this perspective.
204. See California Teachers Ass'n v. Riles, 29 Cal. 3d 794, 632 P.2d 953, 176 Cal. Rptr. 300
(1981).
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